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Abstract In this paper, I explore the role that regret does and should play in medical
decision-making. Specifically, I consider whether the possibility of a patient
experiencing post-treatment regret is a good reason for a clinician to counsel against
that treatment or to withhold it. Currently, the belief that a patient may experience
post-treatment regret is sometimes taken as a sufficiently strong reason to withhold it,
even when the patient makes an explicit, informed request. Relatedly, medical re-
searchers and practitioners often understand a patient’s post-treatment regret to be a
significant problem, one that reveals a mistake or flaw in the decision-making process.
Contrary to these views, I argue that the possibility of post-treatment regret is not
necessarily a good reason for withholding the treatment. This claim is justified by
appealing to respect for patient autonomy. Furthermore, there are occasions when the
very reference to post-treatment regret during medical decision-making is inappropri-
ate. This, I suggest, is the case when the decision concerns a Bpersonally transforma-
tive treatment^. This is a treatment that alters a person’s identity. Because the
treatment is transformative, neither clinicians nor the patient him/herself can ascertain
whether post-treatment regret will occur. Consequently, I suggest, what matters in
determining whether to offer a personally transformative treatment is whether the
patient has sufficiently good reasons for wanting the treatment at the time the decision
is made. What does not matter is how the patient may subsequently be changed by
undergoing the treatment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I explore the role that regret does and should play in medical decision-making.1
Specifically, I consider whether the possibility of a patient experiencing post-treatment regret is
a good reason for a clinician to counsel against that treatment or to withhold it. This is an
important issue to address given the significant impact that medical treatment can have upon a
person’s physical and psychological health. Determining when a treatment is appropriate –
understood here as a process of weighing the reasons for and against it – is thus a matter of
vital concern to both patients and doctors. Currently, the belief that a patient may experience
post-treatment regret is sometimes taken as a sufficiently strong reason to withhold it, even
when the patient makes an explicit, informed request (Brockwell 2015). Relatedly, medical
researchers and practitioners often understand a patient’s post-treatment regret to be a signif-
icant problem, one that reveals a mistake or flaw in the decision-making process.
Contrary to the above views, I argue that the possibility of post-treatment regret is not
necessarily a good reason for withholding the treatment. This claim is justified by appealing to
respect for patient autonomy. Furthermore, there are occasions when the very reference to post-
treatment regret during medical decision-making is inappropriate. This, I suggest, is the case
when the decision concerns a Bpersonally transformative treatment^. This is a treatment that
alters a person’s identity (e.g. their preferences, feelings, desires, values, life-plans and/or
relationships). Because the treatment is transformative, neither clinicians nor the patient him/
herself can ascertain whether post-treatment regret will occur. Consequently, I suggest, what
matters in determining whether to offer a personally transformative treatment is whether the
patient has sufficiently good reasons for wanting the treatment at the time the decision is made.
What does not matter is how the patient may subsequently be changed by undergoing the
treatment.
2 What is Regret?
Regret is a complex, multivalent concept (Landman 1993). One can use the term as a
somewhat empty, ritualised expression for having to perform an action that will cause someone
sadness or suffering, e.g. BWe regret to inform you that we are unable to accept your paper for
publication in this journal^. One can also use the term to express sympathy, sorrow or grief,
e.g. BIt was with much regret that I learned of your recent misfortune^. Furthermore, we may
refer to human or natural events as Bdeeply regrettable^. Finally, Bagent regret^ (Rorty 1980)
refers to a person’s attitude2 toward their decisions that they wish they had not made. Typically,
this will be because the consequences of the decision were worse than they had expected them
to be (Gilovich and Medvec 1995; Zeelenberg et al. 2000). Agent regret is often experienced
1 By Bmedical decision-making^ I refer to the process by which a course of treatment is determined to be
appropriate for a patient. I assume that the decision-making process will be guided by (a) concern for the patient’s
(best) interests; (b) respect for the patient’s autonomy; and (c) adherence to generally accepted moral principles.
This account is idealised compared to how decisions are often made in hospitals and doctors’ surgeries, where
pressures of time, financial constraints, and the lack of equipment, information and suitably-skilled staff can
influence what treatments are offered.
2 This attitude incorporates both feelings and judgements: I feel regret and simultaneously judge that something is
regrettable. Thus, Landman (1993, 36) describes regret as ‘an experience of felt-reason or reasoned-emotion’,
whilst Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007, 6) use the term ‘cognitive emotion’.
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as a form of self-reproach and is taken to reveal that one’s decision-making was flawed
(Bourgeois-Gironde 2010). In what follows, it is this final form of regret that I discuss and to
which I refer when using the word.
Regret is a negative emotion: it is unpleasant to experience regret and we often strive to
avoid it (Janis and Mann 1977; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Typically, this involves
subjecting important decisions to extensive reflection before acting to ensure the best option
is taken and the optimal outcome is achieved. Anticipated regret thus plays a role in people’s
decision-making processes (Zeelenberg 1999; Zeelenberg et al. 1996). This includes decision-
making about medical treatment (Speck et al. 2016). Because the experience of regret is
unpleasant, and because we tend to assume that it indicates a flawed decision, the belief that
we will regret doing something is taken as a strong reason against that course of action. This
suggests that we can be justified in endeavouring to prevent both ourselves and others from
experiencing regret. However, as I will argue below, sometimes we should take decisions that
we might come to regret. Furthermore, not all regrets can be avoided simply by making more
better decisions. Thus, some regrets do not demonstrate a flaw in the decision-making process.
This is because some regrets are unforeseeable and uncontrollable from the perspective of the
agent at the time that she is deliberating about what to. These claims will be explained and
defended once the current understanding of regret within medical practice and research has
been examined.
3 Clinical Perspectives on Patient-regret
The issue of regret has received relatively little attention from philosophers.3 Within medical
ethics and health care, post-treatment regret has been documented in relation to, for example,
cancer treatments (Christie et al. 2015; Fernandes-Taylor and Bloom 2010), abortion
(Fergusson et al. 2009; Major 2000), gender confirmation treatment (Olsson and Möller
2006; Smith et al. 2005) and voluntary sterilisation (Curtis et al. 2006; Hillis et al. 1999).
However, its normative status in and implications for medical decision-making are rarely
assessed. Owing to the limitations of space, I will discuss regret in relation to gender
confirmation treatment (GCT) and voluntary sterilisation (VS). In focusing on them, I do
not mean to efface the many differences between them. For example, GCT is a complex, multi-
stage and expensive process, whereas sterilisation is a quick, cheap, one-off procedure. Post-
sterilisation regret will thus target a single, isolated decision, whereas post-GCT regret can
target either the cumulative effect of a series of decisions or a part of that process. What unites
them, for the purposes of this paper, is that many clinicians and researchers have expressed
concern that patients will regret undergoing GCT or being sterilised.4 I will refer to this regret
as Bpatient-regret^. It is often assumed that patient-regret (a) is a strong reason against offering
3 Notable exceptions include Rorty (1980), Williams (1981), Bittner (1992); Bagnoli (2000) and Wallace (2013).
4 Several factors may explain clinicians’ worries about patient-regret following GCT or VS. Both are likely to
have a significant impact upon a person’s well-being. Both are nominally irreversible – reversing them is
difficult, expensive and success rates are variable depending on what is being reversed – and concern features
of a person – gender and parenthood – that, at least within contemporary societies, are fundamental to who one is
and how one experiences the world. This renders decisions to transition and to forego having children very
significant ones, and hence ones that it is natural to want to get right. It may also render a person’s regret about
transitioning or being sterilised more painful.
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these treatments; and (b) reveals a problem in the decision-making process through which the
treatment was identified as appropriate.
Before proceeding, a few clarificatory remarks about GCT may be helpful. I use the term to
refer to the process of physically changing one’s sex/gender,5 which is achieved through
hormone treatment and surgery. The alteration of a person’s sex/gender is also referred to as
sex or gender reassignment surgery (SRS / GRS). I will treat these terms as synonymous as
they refer to the same group of medical treatments and procedures. For trans men, these
include taking testosterone, bilateral mastectomy, hysterectomy, phalloplasty, scrotoplasty and
penile implant. For trans women, these include taking oestrogen, facial feminisation surgery,
orchidectomy, vaginoplasty, vulvoplasty, clitoroplasty and breast implants.
Many trans individuals undergo only some of these procedures, either through choice,
medical limitations or financial constraints (Davy 2011). There is thus variety in how people
transition and what their desired gender identity is. Furthermore, trans individuals are demo-
graphically diverse. Although more cis men than cis women are recorded as trans, the
difference in population size is not vast – although numbers vary from study to study and
country to country – and is diminishing (Meier and Labuski 2013; Reed et al. 2011; Whittle
et al. 2008).6 People of many different ages transition and they may identify themselves as
trans when very young or much later in life (Davy 2011; Flores et al. 2016; Nealy 2017).
Finally, trans individuals are situated across the economic spectrum, although they tend to be
towards the poorer end of it (Whittle et al. 2008).
Despite this diversity, much of the medical research focuses exclusively on male-to-female
transsexuals. Nevertheless, what is important about this research is that it treats the possibility
of a person coming to regret their decision to transition as a major problem. For example,
Olsson and Möller (2006, 501) argue that ‘Persistent regret after sex reassignment surgery…
must be considered, along with suicide, as the worst possible outcome of SRS’. As a result,
‘Every regret case represents a major clinical and ethical problem’ (502). These are strong
claims: regret is comparable to suicide in terms of negative outcomes following GCTand every
regret case must be considered a major clinical and ethical problem. Expressing similar
concerns, Landén et al. (1998, 287) state that ‘Every effort must be made to avoid individuals
who ask for a reversal of sex reassignment’; Smith et al. (2005, 90) declare that ‘it is
imperative to try and prevent post-operative regret’; and Smith et al. (2001, 472) highlight
that ‘one of the main objections of professionals against a start of the sex reassignment
procedure before 18 years [of age] is the risk of postoperative regret’.
The possibility of post-treatment regret is sometimes treated as a strong reason, even a
sufficient and overriding one, for withholding GCT (cf. Batty 2004; Duke 2014). Jeffreys
(2008, 2014) draws on occurrences of post-transition regret to support her argument that GCT
should be banned. Similarly, the website Bsexchangeregret.com^ is dedicated to documenting
experiences of regret following GCT. The website’s author, Walt Heyer, argues that GCT is an
inappropriate response to / solution for gender dysphoria. Although he stops short of calling
for it to be banned, he stresses that it can cause ‘irreversible damage’ and urges individuals
5 Theorists have critiqued the tenability of a clear distinction between a person’s sex and their gender (e.g.
Fausto-Sterling 2000). I use the term Bsex/gender^ to acknowledge this without being able to discuss it further
here.
6 The existing data are, however, problematic (Meier and Labuski 2013). First, many individuals do not openly
declare themselves to be trans. Second, a potentially large number of trans individuals do not choose medical
treatment and thus are not recorded in many statistics. Third, the term Btrans^ covers a wide array of gender
identities and research may include only a certain portion of them.
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who are considering GCT to proceed with ‘extreme caution’. There is a strong implication
underpinning the content of the website that one will likely come to regret transitioning. Heyer
and Jeffreys take post-treatment regret to indicate a problem with GCT itself and to be a strong
reason for denying individuals’ requests for it.
Olsson and Möller (2006, 502–3) state that their case report ‘will hopefully contribute to a
growing body of knowledge that in the future will reduce the number of bad choices for SRS
and also the number of regret cases’. Their view implies that post-treatment regret is linked to /
caused by poor decision-making. Similarly, Djordjevic et al. (2016) equate post-GCT regret
with misdiagnosis. If the decision-making process had been improved, the argument suggests,
then regret would have been avoided (perhaps psychotherapy or some other means of working
through the patient’s feelings of gender dysphoria, would have been more effective / appro-
priate). I think this line of thinking is problematic, as I will explain below.
Worries that a patient will experience post-treatment regret are also voiced in relation to
sterilisation requests, especially when the patient is a childfree woman under the age of 30
(Lawrence et al. 2011).7 The major concern is that such women will later want to have
children, which will result in significant regret. This leads to many requests for sterilisation
made by young, childfree women being denied (Campbell 1999; Gillespie 2000). Indeed,
Richie (2013, 38) reports that women’s accounts of denied sterilisation requests are ‘ubiqui-
tous’.8 Thus, when discussing sterilisation requests, I refer primarily to childfree women under
the age of 30. I will examine whether the possibility that these women will regret choosing to
be sterilised is a good reason to deny their requests for it. However, my argument will apply
also to postpartum women who request sterilisation, should concerns be raised that they too
may regret their decision.
Much of the research into women’s experiences of sterilisation is focused on factors
associated with post-sterilisation regret (Curtis et al. 2006; Hillis et al. 1999). The implicit
assumption underlying this research is that patient-regret is undesirable and should be
prevented, which can be achieved by improving the decision-making process. Whilst clini-
cians’ concerns about patient-regret may well be commendable, given the unpleasantness of
regret, it is important to consider whether a patient’s future regret is something that clinicians
(a) should prevent; and (b) can prevent. Because the latter is a more complex issue than the
former, I shall deal with the former first.
4 Should a Patient’s Regret be Prevented?
Let us assume that the experience of regret is detrimental to one’s wellbeing (Jokisaari 2003):
one’s life goes better, other things being equal, if one has fewer regrets. Given this assumption,
it seems reasonable for clinicians to strive to reduce the likelihood of patient-regret. Doing so, it
might be argued, will improve patient well-being and indicate that the treatment was appropri-
ate. It would thus be consistent with the principle of beneficence, which is a central component
of medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 203ff). However, this must be considered in
relation to another key principle of medical ethics: respect for patient autonomy (214ff).
7 The demography of women who request sterilisation is diverse (Hillis et al. 1999; Zite and Borrero 2011). They
come from a wide range of racial, ethnic and socio-economic groups, may be single or with a partner, and may
have no, one or several children.
8 Notably, it seems to be much easier for a man to be sterilised than a woman (Richie 2013).
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Discussion of autonomy can be difficult, given the numerous ways it is understood
(Christman 1989; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000).9 Within medical ethics, autonomy is often
equated with informed consent about one’s medical care, principally the right to refuse
treatment (which was historically necessary, given the strong paternalism that pervaded health
care). However, I will understand it in a deeper sense, as relating to how a person organises
their life in respect to their central values, desires and projects. To be autonomous is to be able
to lead a life, which involves reflection on one’s goals and projects. Thus, to respect someone’s
autonomy is to recognise them as capable of shaping their life and the kind of person they want
to be.10
On this richer account, respect for patient autonomy is not just a matter of consenting to
treatment, it also includes a presumption that clinicians should consider a patient’s expressed
desires, values, feelings and plans when considering what treatment is appropriate. This is
central to patient-centred care (Epstein and Street 2011). Clinicians are not legally required to
agree to a patient’s request for treatment – although they are legally required to accept a
patient’s refusal of treatment – but the patient may legitimately expect them to agree to it
unless there are sufficiently strong reasons against the treatment (and I am interested in
whether post-treatment regret constitutes such a reason).
This applies not only to life-saving or life-preserving treatment, but also to life-enhancing
treatment. For example, a patient may request an intrauterine device (IUD) as their preferred
form of contraception, with the expectation that their doctor will agree to this request.
Alternatively, a doctor may prescribe diazepam to a patient with severe aviophobia. In both
cases, the treatment is not physiologically necessary – the patient’s physical health will not
worsen if the request is denied11 – but rather is aimed at improving the patient’s quality of life.
It is likely that there is a blurred line between treatments and procedures that fall within the
remit of medical health care and those that are considered Bcosmetic^. However, I assume it is
reasonable to include GCT and VS as a part of medical health care. For GCT, this is because of
the psychological distress / existential suffering associated with gender dysphoria. For VS, this
is because of the importance that reproductive control has for a person’s well-being and sense
of dignity, the fact that some people are unable to utilise other forms of contraception, and the
significant impact that unplanned pregnancy and parenthood can have on a person’s body and
life.12
Consider, then, the type of sterilisation request that many clinicians are reluctant to agree
to.13 A 27-year-old woman is certain that she wants to live a childfree life. She thinks that
parenthood is incompatible with many of her central values, feelings and projects. She has an
adverse reaction to the pill and cannot use an IUD owing to a copper allergy. However, even if
9 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify my understanding of autonomy and its
implications for my argument.
10 This is not to impute to people the ability for radical self-creation ex nihilo. We all find ourselves with a
complex identity that is not of our choosing. Nevertheless, we retain the ability to make significant life decisions
about who we want to be that reflect core values and feelings, even if these values and feelings are not of our
choosing.
11 An exception would be if a sexually-active woman has a health condition that would threaten her physical
health, were she to become pregnant. Here, the IUD might be deemed to be life-saving or life-preserving.
12 Given that suicide rates among the trans population are reported between 30 and 40% (Haas et al. 2014;
Whittle et al. 2008, and given that various medical conditions can severely impact the health of a pregnant
woman and her foetus, then both perhaps GCT and VS can, in some cases at least, be classified as life-saving.
13 The description is based on the real-life example of Holly Brockwell (Brockwell 2015).
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she could use an IUD, she is adamant that sterilisation is her preferred method of contracep-
tion. She is aware that it is a permanent, irreversible procedure (she sees this as a positive
aspect of sterilisation). She is also aware that she might later change her mind and want to
become pregnant, although she is adamant that she has no reason to think it will happen. This
awareness does not undermine or erode her desire for sterilisation. She insists that she is happy
to live with the consequences of their decision, even if she does change her mind. She is happy
to live with her regret.
Respect for the patient autonomy entails that the doctor ought to agree to the request. (This
argument is, of course, intended to apply to other medical treatments, such as GCT, that give
rise to worries about patient-regret). The desire not to have children is persistent, has been
subjected to extensive self-reflection, and is consistent with the patient’s values and long-term
plans. It remains possible that she may change as a person in a such way that she does want to
have children. We cannot guarantee that our identities will remain unchanged throughout our
lives. Nevertheless, her request for sterilisation is an autonomous one: it is made following
extensive reflection on her deeply-held values, feelings and projects. When confronted with
such a request, clinicians should not shield us from future regret. As Richie (2013, 39) argues,
‘regret is the competent woman’s burden, not the doctor’s’. Similarly, Denbow (2015, 70)
claims that being autonomous ‘entails living with the consequences of decisions instead of
being relentlessly protected from potential adverse outcomes’. Part of respecting a person’s
autonomy is allowing them to make decisions that could later be regretted, so long as the
decision can be justified at the time it is made.
We may still hold that clinicians should make patients aware of the possibility of post-
treatment regret and factors that might induce or exacerbate it, such as the irreversibility or
negative side-effects of the treatment. This would help patients to make more informed
decisions. However, the possibility of regret should not be taken as an overriding reason to
withhold a treatment, so long as the request is made in an autonomous, sufficiently-informed
manner. It is notable that this perspective on regret and autonomy seems to be adopted in other
areas of medical decision-making. For example, the possibility of regret is not raised when a
patient requests IVF treatment or an organ removal for donation, even though both can have a
significant impact upon one’s life and well-being.14 Nevertheless, people have expressed
regrets about choosing to have IVF treatment (BBC 2013; Connell 2013; Daniluk 2001) and
there is a growing body of literature documenting people’s regrets about having children
(Donath 2015; Marsh 2017). This suggests a questionable asymmetry between the role that
regret plays in decision-making about sterilisation compared to, say, IVF (Mertes 2016).
The appeal to patient autonomy will leave occasions when the patient’s request for
treatment should be denied. For example, a young, childfree woman may request sterilisation
but still express her desire to give birth to children later in their life and has planned her future
accordingly (perhaps because she does not realise it is irreversible). The request cannot be
justified, given the patient’s identity, and so it is appropriate for the clinician to deny it.
Because the patient lacks good reasons for wanting the treatment, we are right to expect them
to later regret their decision and to act to prevent this regret (just as someone who goes against
their better judgement and, in a moment of rashness, buys a car that is clearly in need of repair
14 In the UK, the eligibility criteria for IVF treatment contain no reference to patient-regret, such as the
e xp e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i l l n o t r e g r e t t h e i r d e c i s i o n . h t t p : / /www. nh s .
uk/Condi t ions/IVF/Pages /Avai labi l i ty.aspx and ht tp : / /www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg156
/chapter/Recommendations#access-criteria-for-ivf.
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or unsuitable for their needs will likely come to regret doing so). However, if a woman’s
identity does count strongly in favour of sterilisation – she is sure she does not want to have
children; her values and future plans are incompatible with parenthood; she is willing to accept
the consequences of her decision – then refusing her request by appealing to future regret
would be unjustifiable. This is because it fails to respect her autonomy.
5 Can a Patient’s Regret be Prevented?
In the previous section, I claimed that a clinician’s desire to prevent patient-regret can be
outweighed by respect for patient autonomy. This still treats prospective regret as relevant to
the medical decision-making process: preventing regret plays a role, just not a decisive one, in
determining whether a treatment should be offered to a patient. However, it can be argued that,
for some treatments, regret should play no role in deciding whether a treatment is appropriate.
This, I suggest, is the case when the decision is about a Bpersonally transformative treatment^
(PTT).
A PTT is a treatment that changes a person’s identity (e.g. their preferences, values, beliefs,
feelings or projects). Furthermore, what it is like to experience these changes first-personally –
what it will be like for me to experience them – cannot be known beforehand and so one will
only know how one feels about the changes when one has undergone them. PTTs represent
what Paul (2014) refers to as transformative experiences. A transformative experience, she
writes, is one that ‘can change your point of view, and by extension, your personal preferences,
and perhaps even the kind of person that you are or at least take yourself to be’ (16).
Importantly, it ‘teaches you something new, something that you could not have known before
the experience, while also changing you as a person’ (17).
In practice, it may be difficult to decide whether a treatment will be personally transfor-
mative. Nonetheless, there seem to be some reasonably clear-cut cases. Taking antibiotics or
having a tooth removed will not be personally transformative. Conversely, deep brain stimu-
lation, having one’s sight or hearing restored, chemotherapy, organ transplantation (especially
facial allograft transplantation), having one’s legs amputated, successful IVF, and anti-
depressants such as Prozac are likely to be personally transformative (Glannon 2009;
Maguire and McGee 1999; Matthews 2011; Svenaeus 2012; Swindell 2007).15 It is likely that
undergoing these treatments will alter an important element of one’s self and represent an
experience that is epistemologically novel. How one experiences and feels about one’s life and
the world will be changed by the treatment: one will develop new feelings, preferences, values,
projects, plans sand/or interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, one’s evaluative framework –
the lens through which one assesses one’s life and the decisions that one has made – will itself
be reworked by experiencing the treatment. This is because one’s evaluative framework is
constituted by one’s identity. Crucially, this affects whether one will regret undergoing the
treatment, for the assessment and experience of regret is determined by one’s current evalu-
ative framework, and this framework is constitutively altered by a PTT.
Does GCT constitute a PTT? One reason for thinking it does not is that the person
undergoing GCT will almost certainly have been living as their preferred gender for some
15 As a reviewer oberved, it is unlikely that VS is a PTT. It is a quick, one-off procedure that will not provide an
epistemically novel experience, identity-changing effect. Thus, the argument in this section will apply to GCT
and not to VS.
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time.16 Thus, after undergoing GCT, the person will be the same gender as they have
previously identified with and lived as.17 However, there are several reasons in favour of
deeming it to be a PTT. First, taking hormones will have a significant effect on one’s emotional
states, body, behaviour and social interactions (Rubin 2003; Davy 2011). What it will be like
first-personally to experience these changes, and how one will feel about them, cannot be
known prior to taking the hormones. Second, the actual experience of having, say,
vaginoplasty or phalloplasty can be phenomenologically significant, changing one’s body
schema and bodily activities (e.g. how one experiences sexual pleasure, both with oneself
and other people). Third, there is an important difference between using clothing and behav-
iour to inhabit one’s desired gender identity and physically altering one’s body. Fourth, one’s
identity and sense of self are heavily shaped by one’s social relationships and experiences.
These, in turn, will be strongly affected by the transition treatments one has undergone. In sum,
‘Changing one’s gender… will radically change one’s life’ (McKinnon 2015, 422). Conse-
quently, ‘The decision to transition… is also a paradigmatic transformative decision’ (423).
To appreciate the challenge that PTTs pose for medical decision-making, consider what I
take to a plausible, albeit idealised, account of how GCT is deemed to be appropriate for a
patient. (If one does not think that GCT is personally transformative, then one can run the
example with a treatment that is considered to be so). A gender dysphoric individual requests
GCT. In deciding whether to agree to the request, clinicians will try to determine what the
patient’s feelings, preferences, values and plans are. This will include answering questions
such as: does the patient have an enduring, stable desire to live in an alternative sex/gender?
Do their preferences for the life that they want to lead fit with such transitioning? Do they
understand what the procedures involve? In sum, does the patient’s preference-set render GCT
the most appropriate treatment? In addition, they will want to know how the treatment will
affect the patient’s life. This will involve establishing how the patient will feel about the
treatment after they have transitioned: they will want to be sure that the patient will not regret
their decision.
The difficulty GCT (or alternative PTT) poses is that it is personally transformative. Thus,
what it will be like for the person to undergo GCT – to take hormones, to inhabit their altered
body, to live in society as their new sex/gender – is not something that they can know prior to
transitioning. Thus, they cannot how they will feel about undergoing GCT (i.e. what their post-
GCT life will be like) until they have completed it; they cannot not know beforehand how their
sense of self and their evaluative framework will be altered by GCT. As McKinnon (2015,
422) observes, ‘in almost all cases, one’s post-transition preferences will have shifted over
time: it’s impossible to predict what gender presentation preferences one will have post
transition, and how those choices will feel like, and how they will affect others’ interactions
with oneself’.
Consequently, neither the patient nor doctor can know whether the patient will regret their
decision to undergo GCT, until the decision is made. This means we cannot be guaranteed to
prevent regret from occurring because we cannot know the person will be changed by the
treatment (which includes what it is like to experience the change and how they feel about it).
Thus, when confronted with a PTT, I suggest that the possibility of patient-regret should be
deemed irrelevant to the decision-making process. What matters is that (a) the patient is
16 It is common requirement for surgery that trans individuals spend a minimum of a year living in their preferred
gender role (NHS Choices 2016).
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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sufficiently informed about the treatment; (b) the patient has sufficiently good reasons, at the
time of asking, for wanting it; and (c) these reasons are consistent with the patient’s central
values, preferences, plans and the like. What does not matter whether patient-regret will occur.
This cannot be known prior to offering the treatment and so should not be included in the
decision-making process that determines whether the treatment is appropriate. This challenges
the positions of Speck et al. (2016) and Djulbegovic et al. (1999), who hold that future regret
should form an essential part of medical decision-making.
At this point, one may worry that the transformative nature of a treatment is a threat to a
patient’s capacity for autonomous choice. Can one make an autonomous decision to undergo a
treatment that changes the kind of life that one leads and, perhaps, wants to lead? Does an
inability to know what one’s post-treatment self will be like mean that one cannot make an
autonomous pre-treatment choice? I do not believe so. Let us assume that autonomy involves
the ability to lead a life, which consists in acting in ways that are consistent with one’s deeply-
held values, preferences and plans. When choosing to undergo a PTT, one should be sure that
the treatment is consistent with who one is now. This will include preferences about who one
wants to be and the life that one wants to have. For example, when requesting GCT, one
should be confident that transitioning is consistent with the future life one envisages. It may be
that the process of transitioning changes one’s identity in a way that means that one does not
want to stay as one’s new sex/gender; one comes to want to lead a life that is different to the
life one envisaged when deciding to transition. One will not know if this is the case until one
has transitioned. However, if this occurs, then it would not mean that one’s decision was, or is
retrospectively rendered, non-autonomous. Rather, it shows there is a limit to what we can
know and control when it comes to who we are and how we are changed by our decisions. It is
important that this is acknowledged in medical decision-making.
6 Does Post-treatment Regret Signify a Mistake?
The above discussion has important implications for how regret is understood in medical
decision-making. As was noted, some clinical researchers take patient-regret to reveal a
mistake or flaw in the decision-making process through which treatment is identified as
appropriate (Djordjevic et al. 2016; Olsson and Möller 2006). This implies that by improving
the decision-making process, we can reduce post-treatment regret. This is partly right. For
example, during the decision-making process we can try to ensure that the patient is suffi-
ciently informed about what the treatment involves and its possible effects. A patient choosing
a treatment without knowing about its effects can lead to regret, as sometimes occurs when
women do not realise that sterilisation is permanent (Zite and Borrero 2011).18 However, there
are occasions when patient-regret does not reveal a flaw or mistake in the decision-making
process and could not have been eliminated by improving it.
These occasions occur when the patient’s regret could not have been foreseen from the
patient’s or doctor’s deliberative perspective at the time the decision was made. This is the case
with personally transformative treatments, for it could not have been known how the patient
would feel about the treatment until they went through it. Someone may have very good
reasons for requesting GCT, based upon their feelings, embodied experiences and life-plans.
18 Post-GCT regrets may also be linked to unrealistic expectations for, or unawareness of, what surgical results
will be like (Davy 2011).
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However, their experience of transitioning and its effect upon their self changes these feelings
and plans. They now do not want to live as their previously desired sex/gender. Because they
could not have known beforehand what it would be like to experience first-personally the
effects of transitioning (i.e. what it is like for them to transition), then the decision-making
process could not have included this information. The decision to transition – which includes
the clinician’s decision to agree to the request for GCT – was based on the available
information and was justified by it.19 In such scenarios, the future regret does not show that
the decision-making process was flawed.20 We may hold instead that it is the patient’s regret
that is mistaken. The patient ought not regret their decision, precisely because it was justified at
the time it was made.
To support this claim, we can distinguish two possible objects or targets of regret:
decisions and outcomes. One may regret making a rash or otherwise poor decision and
one may regret the effects of that decision. Typically, these will go together: I regret
deciding to walk to the office today, despite hearing the weather forecast, because I am
now soaked to the bone. The unpleasant outcome highlights the flaws in my decision-
making. However, I might regret my decision-making despite the outcome: I regret
thinking that I could jump the distance between two roofs because I fell onto the ground
from a great height (I really ought to have known I would not make it – I only did it
because I was urged on by friends). However, unbeknownst to me, there is a conve-
niently placed mattress, which cushions my fall. Thus, I do not regret the outcome – no
bones were broken – even if I reproach myself for being so foolish. Finally, I may regret
an outcome whilst not regretting the decision: I was right to book my holiday for the
middle of July, when it is most likely to be warm and sunny, even though it happened to
rain for the entire week. Despite how things panned out I do not reproach myself – I
could not have predicted or controlled the weather, especially when booking my holiday
six months earlier.
I suggest that our attitude toward patient-regret should, on certain occasions, be like
the final example. We may wish that the outcome was different, but this does not provide
sufficient warrant to regret the decision, if the decision was justified at the time it was
made. Furthermore, when a treatment is personally transformative, and hence how I will
feel about the outcome cannot be known prior deciding to undergo the treatment
(because I cannot know how I will feel about the changes I undergo), then I cannot
use it as a guide for assessing the soundness of my decision-making. My regret about the
outcome should not transfer to regret about the decision itself. Importantly, because
outcome-regret does not necessarily track decision-regret, I cannot always prevent
outcome-regret by ensuring there is no decision-regret, and vice-versa. This implies that
Olsson and Möller (2006) and Djordjevic et al. (2016), who hold that outcome-regret can
be prevented by ensuring better decision-making, are mistaken. Patient-regret does not
always signify a mistake or flaw in the decision-making process and improving it does
not guarantee that the patient will be free from regret.
19 This argument rests upon the assumption that the justification for a decision is fixed at the time it was made.
For the claim that justification can be retrospective, see Williams (1981).
20 The same argument applies to patient-regret about non-transformative treatments when the patient has been
changed by other events or experiences in their life that leave them regretting their decision to undergo the
treatment, and these events or experiences could not have been foreseen during the decision-making process.
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7 Preventing All Regret
In response to these claims, one may argue the following. Although we cannot determine
beforehand who will or will not regret undergoing a PTT, we know that some people do
experience post-treatment regret.21 Given that regret is unpleasant, we should try to prevent it.
We can do this by withholding all PTTs (and only allowing non-PTTs when we are sure that
the patient will not regret the treatment). Several points can be offered in response to this. First,
we can invoke the argument above that respect for patient autonomy can outweigh the desire to
prevent patient-regret. Second, it overlooks the fact that people also regret things they have not
done. Thus, they can regret that they did not change sex/gender, become sterilised, undergo
IVF or have plastic surgery. Withholding a treatment is not guaranteed to prevent regret. Third,
research suggests that rates of regret for treatments such as SRS and VS are low (see footnote
20). To withhold a treatment because it can result in painful regrets for a minority of patients
would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Finally, it is important to consider the negative consequences of withholding treatment.
Many trans individuals report the experience of gender dysphoria to be very distressing and
insist that GCT helped to alleviate this distress (Davy 2011; Whittle et al. 2008). Thus,
withholding it can result in a much lower level of well-being than if it is offered. Furthermore,
many women who are denied sterilisation ‘remain deeply, desperately worried about unwanted
pregnancy’ (Campbell 1999, 58). In addition, the denial of a sterilisation request can be
experienced as a significant affront to one’s autonomy and dignity, as well as unjustifiably
paternalistic. This is especially the case given the importance that bodily autonomy has for a
person’s sense of self-control and dignity (particularly for women, given the lack of control
that they have had historically over their bodies). Finally, if sterilisation is considered life-
saving – either because some women have medical conditions that would place their own lives
and/or the lives of their foetus at risk, or because pregnancy and childbirth are inherently
dangerous for women – then this would outweigh concerns about regret. Consequently,
withholding a treatment owing to concerns about patient-regret may well be more harmful
to the patient than if the treatment is offered. This is relevant given that concerns about patient-
regret are likely justified by appealing to patient well-being.
A clinician might respond to these points by appealing to the principles of non-maleficence
and the difference between doing and allowing. She may say that she should not offer a
treatment to a patient that results in regret, because this will be to harm the patient. This is
relevantly different to the patient being harmed by not receiving a treatment, as the clinician
has not caused it to occur. However, this argument relies on there being a tenable, morally-
relevant distinction between harm resulting from action and harm resulting from inaction, with
the latter being preferable to the former. This assumption has been challenged (Singer 2011;
Unger 1996). Relatedly, one may also hold that withholding treatment is still a choice that the
clinician makes. Alternatively, if the patient is aware of the possibility of regret and still
requests the treatment, then the clinician need not be identified as responsible for the harm of
regret. As Brockwell (2015) asks in response to doctors’ fears that she will regret being
21 Rates of post-sterilisation regret vary from between 1% and 20%, depending on the study and the participants’
profile, e.g. age and number of offspring (Becner et al. 2015; Curtis et al. 2006; Hillis et al. 1999). Rates of post-
GCT regret are reported to be between 1% and 5% (Landén et al. 1998; Lawrence 2003; Smith et al. 2005).
However, the data should be treated cautiously owing to sample sizes, populations studied (trans men are often
excluded from research), the number of studies and how regret is conceptualised and measured within them. As
noted above, people also regret undergoing IVF and having children.
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sterilised, ‘how could I hold someone else responsible for my choice?’.22 Finally, the harm
resulting from inaction may be far greater than harm that may result from action (even if it
cannot be directly imputed to the clinician). This, I suggested, is likely to be the case with both
GCT and VS.
8 Conclusion
Patient-regret is sometimes viewed by medical researchers and practitioners as (a) something
to be avoided, and hence a strong reason against treatments that the patient may regret
undergoing; and (b) a problem that indicates flaws or mistakes with the decision-making
process through which a treatment is identified as appropriate. I have challenged both these
beliefs. There are times when respect for patient autonomy should outweigh the clinician’s
desire to prevent the patient-regret. In addition, treatments that are personally transformative
pose a problem for considering the possibility of regret as a reason against these treatments.
Owing to the transformative nature of the treatment, the patient cannot know what it will be
like to undergo the treatment and to experience its effects until they do so; they cannot know
how they will later feel about undergoing the treatment because their identity will be altered by
the treatment itself. This means that neither the patient nor their doctor can know whether the
treatment will give rise to regret. In deciding whether to offer a PTT, the focus should be
exclusively on the reasons that the patient has for requesting the treatment at the time of
asking, rather than also considering what their post-identity will be like. This argument also
suggests that post-treatment regret does not necessarily indicate a problem or a mistake / flaw
in the decision-making process. A patient may come to regret undergoing some treatment, but
this does not show that the treatment should not have been offered. Consequently, I have
sought to show that regret should play a less prominent and negative role in medical decision-
making than is currently the case. Hopefully, this will lead to more patients receiving treatment
that they are justified in requesting but are currently denied owing to misplaced concerns about
future regrets.
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